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Interview with Richard Eldridge
Desmond: Talking to Richard on the way over, I
proposed that our discussion would focus on the
theme of autonomy and embeddedness or related-
ness. This is a recurrent concern in all of
Richard’s writing. I thought it would be a good
idea to look at this issue of autonomy and em-
beddedness in a variety of different forms, in
relation to different philosophers that have influ-
enced the work of Richard, but also in a variety
of different domains such as ethics, aesthetics or
literature, romanticism. In the latter the question
of the interplay between art and religion also
comes up as a very important consideration.
Another central theme in Richard’s work is the
tension between aspiration and disappointment,
between longing and the failure to reach a desired
completion. Disappointment and the fact of fail-
ure are not, I would say, absolutized. Disappoint-
ment becomes the occasion of a possible renewal
of striving or aspiration rather than marking a
sceptical outcome in a merely negative sense. But
perhaps the first question to be put today is: How
might you describe your own philosophical back-
ground, the sources of your work, some of the
dominant influences that have shaped it and per-
haps some of the major concerns that have come
to expression?
Eldridge: Perhaps I can say something useful
about the sources and background by responding
first to the thought that I became interested in the
combination of autonomy and embeddedness.
When I was in graduate school and as an under-
graduate even, it was common to think of Kant as
a deontological moral theorist and to draw a very
strong distinction between deontological and
teleological moral theories. Kant, I was taught,
told us that the most important thing was duty
and that besides duty there was a lot of stuff that
was permissible. Duty or considerations of duty
function as side constraints on the pursuit of
worthwhile ends of human life. And there was
nothing particular, so I was taught, to be said
about which ends it was worthwhile to pursue. So
Kant was thought to have rationalized the modern
liberal form of life in which we need side con-
straints on our actions for the sake of social peace
but other than that we’re pretty much on our
own, with no end of human life appointed for us
by reason or by anything else. The strongest form
of this criticism of Kant came in MacIntyre’s
1981 book After Virtue in which he charges mod-
ern liberal culture with having no account of the
good and with failing to understand that the vir-
tues are pursued only in textured detail within
specific practices. MacIntyre argued that liberal-
ism mistook the so-called secondary virtues of
truthfulness, justice and courage for the primary
ones, leaving us with no morality of aspiration or
no sense of how to cultivate ourselves in human
life at all. His thought was that we needed to go
back to Aristotle for a morality of cultivation.
I was very sympathetic to this idea about the
importance of aspiration and cultivation in human
life. My sense of that, of the importance of that,
comes I think from a much more primitive, less
academic sense of the importance of art in human
life. I found myself in the past, from adolescence
on, identifying with artistic gestures in music, in
painting, in poetry, feeling that works of music
and painting and poetry and novels had a sub-
stantive moral communicative effect. They
opened up for me ways of looking at things, so I
thought that there must be something to this idea
of moral cultivation, something to the dawning in
oneself of a sense of orientation in life. As my
studies of Kant and my interests in the arts came
together, I found myself led to the Critique of
Judgment and to the thought that actually in
Kant’s texts there’s a far stronger and more artic-
ulate morality of aspiration than is indicated in
the caricature picture of Kant that MacIntyre was
attacking. So I focused from that point on the
Critique of Judgment and on the so-called histori-
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cal and anthropological essays, particularly the
‘Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopoli-
tan Point of View’ and the ‘Conjectural Begin-
ning of Human History.’
In the last ten years or so there’s been enor-
mously strong work on the connection between
Kant’s anthropology and philosophy of history on
the one hand and his moral philosophy on the
other. Numbers of commentators have looked at
how in Kantian terms the work of human beings
in culture is to create and sustain a moral life of
freedom among themselves. So my work on the
arts and on the role of art in the creating and
sustaining of a culture draws its inspiration from
this enriched Kantian background, from the
thought that conscientiousness, self-consciousness,
and duty do matter but that one must bring to-
gether with those concerns a strong morality of
aspiration. As for other sources of influence, the
importance of autonomy for me, of taking respon-
sibility for one’s own life and judgement in cog-
nitive terms, has always been very strongly sig-
naled for me by Descartes’ Meditations. I found
that a very powerful and persuasive and liberating
work in a way. I think that Descartes’ own noto-
rious rejection of history and culture are quite
suspect. In one preface to a dialogue called ‘The
Search After Truth,’ he writes that ‘a good man
has no need to have read every book nor to have
carefully learned all that which is taught in the
schools,’ when his own reason ought to teach him
what he ought to do with himself. So there is a
rejection of the idea that our aspirations are prop-
erly articulated, inherited and revised in the
course of our cultural life. But the moment of
contributing oneself originally to the articulation
of an aspiration in Descartes’ is very strong, and
I think his claim to liberate the human subject in
its orientation toward the world expresses a deep
aspiration. What I’m interested in, then, is how
that effort to achieve originality plays itself out
against the background of culture.
D: Maybe we can come back again shortly to the
question of Kantian autonomy and also Descartes,
an interesting coupling in relation to the theme of
aspiration and autonomy. But I’d like to ask you
first about Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein has been a
major influence in your work and your most
recent book Leading a Human Life: Wittgenstein
Intentionality and Romanticism offers a very
extended discussion relative to this afternoon’s
conversation, situating the theme in relation to
German philosophy, German romanticism. But
perhaps you might say something about Wittgen-
stein on that score. My first thought would not be
to think of Wittgenstein as a philosopher that
could be handled under the rubric of autonomy
and embeddedness and the tension between them.
Perhaps that’s because Wittgenstein is so difficult
to classify, so singular as a thinker that a more
general thematic is somewhat hard to name. Does
your own concern with our present theme find
expression in how you read Wittgenstein?
E: Very much; there has been for a long time a
tendency to read Wittgenstein as a kind of com-
munitarian theorist of mind and language. This is
the line on the later Wittgenstein of Saul Kripke’s
notorious little book. It is probably the clearest
expression of this temptation.
D: You get very irritated with Kripke in your
book!
E: I do. From very early on it seemed to me that
this can not be right. I responded to the Investiga-
tions as an achievement of human voice in its
agonies of aspiration and its difficulties of real-
ization in culture. What I mean by this is that in
the communitarian reading Wittgenstein’s Investi-
gations are held to offer us two voices: an episte-
mological voice, seeking certainties, seeking to
know the nature of thought and the primitive
objects of experience, whether these are meta-
physical, material objects on the one hand or
perhaps private sense-data on the other. And a
correcting second voice which emphasizes that
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we come to have a conceptual life only in so far
as we share practices and rules within practices
with others. The communitarian reading holds
that this second voice stands in final authority or
correction of the first voice. Very early on, and I
should mention partly under the influence of
Stanley Cavell who sees things in similar terms,
it seemed to me that that is not right, not faithful
to the achievement of the text as a piece of writ-
ing. For me, what was striking was the endless-
ness of the text, in a way that the second voice’s
corrections and chastisements of the first more
epistemological voice never quite ended in clo-
sure, never yielded a doctrine about the nature of
knowledge. There was no clear assertion of
epistemic communitarianism anywhere in the text,
I thought, so that I began to read the two voices
as internal to Wittgenstein himself, that is, as two
sides of his own wish to think out for himself
how to lead an original life against the back-
ground of culture. It’s worth noticing that there
are some striking things to be said in favour of
the standpoint of the first voice after all. Human
beings develop language and thought and other
beings, dogs and parakeets and chimpanzees,
don’t or at least not in the same way. There must
be some kind of contribution to our cognitive life
that comes from us, and it’s a natural matter or
cause for philosophical interest and curiosity to
wonder what that contribution is, to try to nail it
down, to figure out in what the essence of human
mindedness consists. I see that curiosity as not
admitting of being rooted out in favour of some
image of pastoral domesticity without epistemic
ambition once and for all. And so that’s my sense
of the interest of the text, of how it both voices
that aspiration and its criticism at the same time,
without ending in any definite moment of doc-
trinal conclusion.
D: Could we pursue this point you made about
the two voices of Wittgenstein, as internal to
Wittgenstein. I think it’s an interesting question.
Again we return to our theme of autonomy and
embeddedness. I think what you’re saying is
correct about Wittgenstein: we have a number of
voices here and Wittgenstein dramatizes their
tension, their opposition, their potential resolu-
tions, their failures to agree with each other and
so forth. Indeed in your book you talk about
problems connected to Wittgenstein’s writerliness.
But Philosophical Investigations has always
struck me as, in a way, a man talking to himself.
I mean: while there are a number of different
voices, all of them in some regard are
Wittgenstein’s voice. Perhaps a different sense of
embeddedness in a community of many voices
seems to be an aspiration for Wittgenstein but as
a reader one doesn’t actually feel the robust pres-
ence of the voices of others. At least, this is part
of my experience as a reader of the text. I’m
supposed to be interviewing so I shouldn’t go on
too long, but when I read Cavell, for example, he
makes me more interested about Wittgenstein’s
text. When I read you, you make me more inter-
ested in reading, in going back to Wittgenstein
again. I am brought back to Wittgenstein by
another. Just reading Wittgenstein cold, so to say,
does not bring me into the passion of his own
seeking, in the way that readers (like you and
Cavell) help to do. My point would be something
like this: in terms of the theme of autonomy and
embeddedness, could you make it clear that for
all the surface of the communitarian Wittgenstein,
his very practice as a philosopher testifies, or at
least makes one wonder, if this is a thinker bound
up in his own solitude, arguing with his solitude,
trying to get outside his solitude. There’s a cer-
tain autonomy yes, but at a deeper level, a kind
of tormented pathway that Wittgenstein is trying
to draw for himself towards recommencement in
a different embeddedness in community. His
philosophical resources show a kind of dramatic
model of thinking, but in a way that paradoxical-
ly gives the lie to a merely communitarian read-
ing of Wittgenstein.
E: I think it’s true that Wittgenstein will not be
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to everyone’s taste and to a considerable extent
for the reasons you mentioned. His conversation
with himself does sometimes seem perhaps too
solipsistic, too little a part of the conversation of
a wider community. I’m not without some appre-
ciation of the force of that criticism for him.
What I mean by his writerliness, however, is that
he allows his conversation with himself to be free
of guidance by any kind of method that yields
results. He wishes to know how and why it is
that I am minded and capable of an independent
point of view on things. It doesn’t count for him
as an answer to say ‘I just happen to be a human
being born in a culture.’ He wants a deeper an-
swer than that, because he’s concerned to try to
sublime away the risks of repudiation and the fact
of human responsibility, just as I think Descartes
in his Meditations tried to sublime away human
responsibility by offering us, in the clarity and
distinctness rule, a rule for the acquisition of
knowledge such that if we followed it, we could
never make a mistake. That’s a very, very strong
claim.
Part of one’s interest in Wittgenstein will
probably depend on how deeply one feels that
Cartesian temptation to be free of human risk and
responsibility, by having on hand a method for
controlling judgement absolutely, so that we
never make a mistake. I have felt that temptation,
perhaps in my sense of belatedness or difficulty
in inheriting culture. I have wanted that kind of
guidance that an epistemological criterion of
absolute knowledge could give, and so I find
myself drawn in to Wittgenstein’s solipsism, or
his conversation with himself.
There are numbers of attractions about this for
me: one is its endlessness. I think that it’s actual-
ly a very strong conversation with himself to the
extent that there just is no definite moral or doc-
trine about the nature of mindedness that emerges
Second, and here again I’ve been very influenced
by Stanley Cavell, once one sees this kind of
conversation going on in Wittgenstein and sees
him as caught up in this kind of concern to sub-
lime away risks and human responsibilities, one
begins to see a concern something like that
played out in many literary texts: for Cavell
many of the texts of Shakespeare, particularly
Othello; for me some texts of Romanticism. So it
offers strong terms for entering into what’s going
on in the motivations of some of the characters in
literature who are most significant in our cultural
imagination. Third, I would say that Wittgenstein
is to some extent an early 20th century figure. He
writes as a modernist philosopher in an interest-
ing sense. As Peter Burger has outlined the histo-
ry of artistic culture, in a wonderful little book,
what tends to happen in European culture in the
19th and 20th centuries is a movement away
from Romanticism strictly so called, that is to
say, from the idea that the poet or other artist
shall function as a kind of prophet whose mes-
sage shall be fully received socially, toward a
sense of disappointment and repudiation by the
public’s failure of reception, thus motivating a
kind of inward turn to art for art’s sake or a kind
of psychological turn. I think Wittgenstein, and
certainly his own artistic taste confirms this, was
himself very sceptical about the conditions of
public taste and culture that he encountered and
that, in addition to the general human wish to
sublime away risk and responsibility, that cultural
scepticism also motivated I think the somewhat
inward looking character of his conversation with
himself. I think there’s nothing dishonourable
about it. It has its cultural condition and its intrin-
sic interest alike
D: Maybe we can come back later to that ques-
tion of art in the 19th century, into the 20th cen-
tury. One of the questions I would hope to put
concerns art’s own desire to be autonomous; this
produces precisely the result that art loses its em-
beddedness in a richer culture; in a certain sense
there’s a self-fulfilling dynamic by means of
which the culture rejects what has already set
itself apart, perhaps even in superiority from the
general culture. So you could claim that Roman-
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tic and post-Romantic art live the destiny of au-
tonomous art which finds itself beached, so to
say, devoid of relations. Then it goes on to blame
the philistinism of modern culture for what is, in
part, self-produced.
But first this: there’s a word you used which I
found very interesting: ‘sublime away.’ It’s a
very interesting term, but as you use ‘sublime
away,’ it seems to indicate what I would call a
desire for a certain univocity in which all the
ambiguities of life are overcome. This is abso-
lutely appropriate to our topic. But you could say
that the sublime produces exactly the opposite of
‘subliming away’: it shows the very insecurity of
the human being within the whole. The Romantic
experiences the sublime in a very ambiguous
way, not at all in the sense of ‘subliming away’
as you seem to use this term. I take the experi-
ence of the sublime precisely to rock us back
upon our own lack of mastery of the situation,
rather than conferring on us that control so
sought after by Descartes and some other modern
thinkers.
E: It’s a very powerful and interesting line of
thought.
D: Where does this idiom come from?
E: I think that this is also in Cavell, I think in an
essay called ‘Being Odd, Getting Even.’ But what
it carries to me is this sense of the lifting from
our shoulders of a kind of burden of being open
to the judgement of others and standing under
their gaze. Now this want to be free of that bur-
den has quite arguably two different contending
sources. One is that it’s a quite primitive wish
that appears in childhood. Children are very de-
pendent beings. They don’t know how to do
things, and their sense of what life is all about
depends very much on the approval of other
people. So it’s a very natural wish in children to
be told the rules for doing such-and-such: the
rules for doing well on school examinations, the
rules for doing well at sport, as though if you just
had the right rules you could be freed from that
kind of dependency and enter into full adulthood.
Put that way, the wish to have authoritative rules
for cultural performance seems to be a wish that
we should outgrow, seems to be something char-
acteristic of childhood dependencies as opposed
to maturity’s acknowledgment that there are no
such rules available to guide cultural per-
formance. But there’s a second source to this
wish also, I think. In my most recent work I’ve
been following out the source of this wish in the
terms of Kant’s discussion of the fact of reason.
That is the thought in Kant that human beings are
the kind of beings who are capable of asking
about their own judgements and contemplated
courses of action, ‘Is this something I really
ought to do?’ If there is a perennial human possi-
bility of asking that kind of question that’s built
into the structure of consciousness, then the effort
to find the terms in which to answer that question
is not going to be an effort that it is easy to give
up. So I would point to the wish for rules that
would absolutely guide us in our cultural perfor-
mances, whether cognitive, practical or artistic, as
having these two different sources. In my own
work instead of trying to fill in in detail and
absolutely the terms of the realization of that
wish, I’ve pointed rather to its endlessness and to
how the wish expresses both a sense of depen-
dency and a sense of openness to the force of
reason at the same time.
D: How do you respond to the line of thought
that one of the characteristics of the modern quest
for autonomy or definition of autonomy is deeply
connected with a desire for rules that are as uni-
vocal as possible. Again I’m thinking of your
remarks earlier on Descartes and the title of an-
other one of his books Rules for the Regulation
of the Mind. I see in Descartes certainly a desire
for autonomy; but the usually unregulated use of
the mind is not going to give us the autonomy we
seek; we need the method and we need rules to
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provide us with mathematical univocity in an
otherwise equivocal universe; indeed our own
equivocity as human beings has to be mastered.
So the quest for autonomy guiding itself by ratio-
nal rules might well be seen, not as conducive to
a rich sense of social embeddedness but might
generate rather something quite different. Why do
I want the rules? I want the rules because I want
to be master of my equivocal domain. Why do I
want to be master of my equivocal domain? Be-
cause in the end I want power over it’s equi-
vocity. This fits in with your use of the term, or
Cavell’s use, ‘subliming away.’ In fact, it’s not
really subliming at all, it’s reductive, if you think
of the sublime as elevating us to something that
is unmastered. ‘Subliming away’ in the Cavellian
sense is actually the desire to reduce the rich
matrix of equivocity to our rules, to what we
rule. And is the modern quest for autonomy easy
to disentangle from that quest for rules, not only
the rules that stand over one, but rule over one-
self?
E: It’s certainly not easy to disentangle. I would
enter first just as a cautionary reminder the
thought that, while it’s true that in modernity the
quest for autonomy, exemplified at least in Des-
cartes, takes the form of a search for rules, and
epistemic rules in particular, very strongly, the
quest for autonomy and for the full realization of
openness to the force of reasons is not solely a
modern preoccupation. There are certainly ver-
sions of it in Plato. So I think that it is a quest to
which beings in many cultures, not just modern
cultures, are open first of all. The substantive
point is that I’m not myself clear in your termi-
nology perhaps what a picture of living in equi-
vocity and in acknowledgement of equivocity
really looks like. One of the ways I can put my
reserve about this and motivate the thought that
the quest for autonomy, for the full realization of
openness to the force of reasons, (which is per-
haps expressed in a certain way in modern art’s
quest for autonomy from other forms of practice)
is by talking for a moment about Tolstoi. Tolstoi
was a figure who, late in his life after writing his
great novels, wrote not only ‘What is Art?’, but
numbers of other short stories in which he tried
to give expression to the shared religious senti-
ment of mankind. I think in most people’s ac-
counts, at least in mine, these late stories and the
essay ‘What is Art?’ are much less interesting
than Tolstoi’s novels. I have in mind the quests
in different ways in Anna Karenina of Levin to
try to find a condition of human life in which he
would be at peace, a condition that he imagines
the Russian peasants might be living in, so he’s
continually tempted to try to work in the fields
and eat black bread and sit in the sunshine and so
forth. Or it's almost inversion and double at the
same time: the quest of Anna to realize her pas-
sion, to break free of the constraints that a wom-
an must suffer in 19th century Russian society,
perhaps to give expression to what turns out to be
her own wish for intense experience. I think we
identify much more with figures like Levin and
Anna than we do with the simpler pastoral figures
that the later Tolstoi wished to enter as record of
full human accomplishment. It’s this — the real
tornness of human being in being open to the
appeal of the force of reasons, yet not knowing
how to realize that appeal — that’s what really
interests me.
Bart Pattyn: It goes without saying that it is im-
possible for us to participate in tradition-bound
societies without critical distance or to pretend
that there is no such a thing as disenchantment.
So we are indeed more interested in Levin’s and
Anna’s wrestling with the conditions of their
time, although it seems that we do not show our
interest because their passions are more humane
than those of the Russian serfs, but because their
passions happen to be our own passions.
William’s critique of the use of the term ‘sub-
liming away’ for the attempt of the human indi-
vidual to justify oneself in no way implies a plea
to return to some pastoral naiveté. It simply
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means that when people intend to justify their
personal life as autonomous, they cannot argue
from the complexity and ambivalence of exis-
tence and do not stand open to what Desmond
could call ‘grace’. It is no accident that I use this
religious term, because, as you were discussing
the ‘sublime’ character of the individual’s attempt
to take responsibility for shaping a courageous
and autonomous life, I could not help thinking
about what Paul wrote to the Romans about the
law. Granted this letter concerns a difficult text
with a variety of interpretations, but the basic
idea which is expressed in this text (if we can
believe Rudolf Bultmann) is that Paul is explain-
ing that the use of the law to justify oneself has a
‘sinful’ character. Autodikaiosune demonstrates a
lack of trust in God, a lack of faith. It implies a
refusal to allow God to circumscribe one’s heart,
a refusal to place oneself trustfully in God’s
hands. And this implies therefore that one does
not leave oneself open to the grace of God’s
Spirit. Have you yourself ever made a connection
between your philosophical position and this
theological explanation?
E: It’s a very interesting question. I guess I think
of Protestantism as in part the thought that lead-
ing our religious life is a continual problem of
human conscientiousness, a continual problem of
giving oneself over to the divine or of accepting
its force. Here I think human beings find them-
selves caught between the need for standing rules
or laws and cultural order on the one hand and
possibilities of improvisatoriness on the other
hand. So it’s interesting that Jesus says two
things. He says in one place that he comes not to
abolish the law but to fulfil the law every jot and
tittle. Of course the notion of the law’s needing
fulfilling is already a criticism perhaps of a kind
of Jewish tradition. Still the idea that Jewish
practice is to be fulfilled by Jesus is not, I think,
off the mark. Yet when asked by the lawyer what
we must do to save ourselves, he tells the parable
of the Good Samaritan. That is a story of human
responsiveness to an ethical demand in a particu-
lar, immediate situation that is free of, even runs
against the requirements of, a settled religious
community. The Samaritan responds out of hu-
manity to humanity. I’m interested very much in
how religious traditions help us to negotiate those
two needs: the need for rules, laws, settled cultur-
al order on the one hand and the importance of
original, improvisatory human responsiveness to
the human on the other hand. The sort of Protes-
tant stance that I’m prepared to affirm is less
interested in what you might call theological
doctrine, that is, the reality of the fact of the
existence of God, as a being that’s somehow like
but also of course different from finite beings. I
don’t have that kind of theological interest, so
much as an interest in the text of the Bible as a
story of continual human efforts to negotiate
those two needs. I find that story deeply revealing
and important, and I accept the idea that we can
hope, even rationally must hope, in the long run
Deo volente, for the unity of the virtues in a
unified culture. What I mean is that we can hope
that the best things that human beings can be and
do shall not leave them ultimately at odds with
one another, but in a condition of social peace.
That’s what I take to be exemplified in the prayer
that Thy Kingdom come, so there’s a kind of
deep religious aspiration there.
B: As you know the interpretation of justification
by faith or by works led to the initial break be-
tween Protestants and Catholics. Whoever asserts
that through regulations and moral judgements
one can find a ‘sublime way’ to attempt to justify
oneself in the midst of the ambivalence of exis-
tence, would seem to be taking a Catholic posi-
tion. How do you react to this as a Protestant?
E: These are enormous generalizations and I
don’t know enough about the history of religion
to be able to affirm a picture of what Catholicism
as a whole holds. It’s sometimes said to me by
my Catholic friends that the great strength of
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Catholicism is that at least it has social tradition
and a picture of human community and the Prot-
estant tradition does not. Well that never seemed
to me to be quite right about the Protestant tradi-
tion, and I’m sure that the thought that the Catho-
lics are trying too much simply through rules to
engineer the inauguration of a moral religious
culture is probably not quite right to Catholicism
either. What interests me again are the terms of
the effort, how it is that human beings are caught
up in this. Paul is a very interesting figure, in that
Paul is both the exemplar of the most striking
kind of immediate human conversion to openness
to the will of God and at the same time the man
through whose letters the official church is by
and large instituted. So he himself combines in
his person as it were the notions of institutional
authority and institutional order with his singular
openness to God’s call. That is a very tricky act.
I’m interested in how human communities have
tried to pull off that act themselves over the long
course of human history.
D: Maybe we can come back to that question of
the religious again. I want to talk about Kantian
autonomy but there is a connection with your
reference to Tolstoi. Let us say this: when Tolstoi
was a certain kind of artist, you might say that
the images of life he offers us show a kind of
open dwelling in the equivocity of human exis-
tence. When he becomes a preacher, his tolerance
for that equivocity decreases dramatically, and he
reformulates the Gospel along more rationalized
lines, very much continuously with desires in the
19th century to make the Gospel more ‘rational.’
I was thinking of Shestov who despised Tolstoi:
in the end he felt that behind Tolstoi’s appeal to
morality was a kind of a secret will to power;
that the law of Tolstoi’s ‘gospel’ becomes
Tolstoi’s law, it becomes his rule, it becomes his
will to rule. We come to the question, related to
Bart’s: whether one’s own sense of self-justifica-
tion before the law not only may close one out
from the aesthetic equivocity of life, but also
from the religious ambiguity of divine grace. So
Tolstoi embodies a tale which can bring us back
to Kant. Clearly you express more sympathy, I
think, for the earlier Tolstoi, but you didn’t want
to renege on what comes to appearance in the
later Tolstoi.
E: That’s right, I do think that Shestov’s criticism
as you describe it seems to be largely right. There
is a turn towards a kind of preacherliness in the
later Tolstoi that does seem to function as a mask
for will to power, in another language, as a way
of embodying the claim on Tolstoi’s part to have
arrived at full and unambiguous authority over
the courses of culture. This seems to me to be a
way of both exempting himself from the human
plight and claiming to have mastered it, a way of
which I’m very suspicious. And yet the aspiration
to something like a moral culture, an aspiration I
said I was prepared to profess a kind of faith in
— a faith in its realizability, Deo volente, in the
fullness of time not through our own unaided
efforts — is something I do take very seriously.
What this has led me to more recently is the
question: ‘If we are so caught up in equivocity, in
your language, or in my own peculiar terms so
caught up in the quest of trying to bring our
human powers to full realization and yet we are
always faced with disappointment and frustration,
or in your terms the persistence of equivocity,
then how is it possible to come to any kind of
peace with oneself, to any sense of what I follow-
ing Heidegger call gratitude in one’s life?’ This is
actually the topic on which my Wittgenstein book
ends, the topic of gratitude.
D: I should say that the equivocity of life is
absolutely fundamental as far as I’m concerned.
But simply reasserting the equivocity as equi-
vocity is not what I want to propose at all. It’s
more a way of listening to or reading what is
communicated in and through equivocity, and not
either a return to a fixed univocalizing stance, or
contrariwise having a Hegelian dialectic which
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also does not do enough justice to the ambiguities
of our situation. Gratitude is extremely fundamen-
tal in what I would like to pursue also, but it
brings us, it seems to me, to the limits of autono-
my. Gratitude also brings us into the neighb-
ourhood of happenings like grace.
E: Just to read a few sentences from near the
very end of my book: I think of gratitude as
achievable and sustainable through an exercise of
what I call remembrance, in German Erinnerung
rather than Gedächtnis, in Greek anamnesis rather
than mneme. That is, one recalls one’s own life as
an instance of a kind of human life in general, of
the presence of human power in life in general,
where the sun shines on the just and the unjust
alike and continues to do so. When one remem-
bers one’s own particular life, as one among
many human lives, there can arise what I call
here toward the end of my book ‘a sense of self-
collection, of stillness or suspension within an
open-ended process without clear beginning in
the given, without obvious end, of the articulation
and exercise of expressive ability. In its location
as a moment of suspension or stillness within
such an open process of leading a life, such a
remembrance also involves a sense of its own
situatedness and transitoriness. It is a moment of
self-recollection of one’s impersonal human iden-
tity as intentionally conscious, involving natural
powers specifically articulated through engage-
ment with public practice. Such a moment is
achieved in partial withdrawal from such engage-
ments, but only partial, and only passing, since
they structurally enable one’s articulate, expres-
sive human life.’ This kind of moment of recol-
lection, culminating in gratitude for the fact of
one’s having had a human life, is exactly what
I’ll be talking about tonight, describing
Hölderlin’s thoughts as he stands on the bridge
overlooking the river in Heidelberg.
D: I’m very sympathetic to what you’re saying.
But maybe we could shift over again to Kant in a
slightly different way. In your first book On
Moral Personhood, you speak of your view as a
kind of ‘Hegelianized Kantianism,’ partly to
make a gesture towards embeddedness in the
social ethos. If I’m not mistaken, and given our
conversations, the Hegelianized aspect of the
Kantianism is muted in your more recent work
and a different Kant, especially of the essays on
history, is more strongly asserted. But the other
Kant, the Kant that fascinates and repels me, let’s
call it the Kant who in modernity reproduces a
kind of Christian Stoicism, this Kant is becoming
muted also. What I mean by that Christian Sto-
icism is: I think of Stoics as those who distin-
guish what is within our power, and what is not
within our power; and what is within our power
is what concerns us; the image of a certain self-
sufficiency in one’s moral being is central; but
one of the implications of moral self-sufficiency
is also the reluctance to be in debt to anything
other than oneself. So I wend my way back to the
issue of gratitude. As you know, classically
Kant’s definition of what is essentially moral
does work with a very strong contrast between
autonomy and heteronomy. Any kind of heterono-
my runs the risk of corrupting the purity of the
moral. Your Kant is clearly one in whom the
autonomous and heteronomous interlink with
each other. But one could point to many places in
Kant, perhaps a more standard Kant, where to be
self-governing, to be self-legislating is counter-
posed to (call it) any ethics of submission to
others. Kant clearly thinks that any form of sub-
mission is incompatible with the moral dignity of
the human being. Now again it is complicated be-
cause, of course, there is a certain obedience to
the moral law; but it is within the domain of
autonomy that obedience to the moral law seems
to take form. We come back to the question of
the law: Is there then room for something like
gratitude; or the grace to be in relation to the
other; and this not in the form of an abject debt,
but as actually having been given something of
oneself from the other, a gift which only recol-
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lectively one recognizes as allowing one to be
free. In other words, are you making up a Kant
that is really running the edges of Kant - using
certain suggestive parts in Kant’s work but in a
manner that really breaks with or moves beyond
Kantianism?
E: There are a number of threads here I’d like to
pick up: to begin with the thought that I was
younger once. I probably have, I certainly have,
less interest now in defending a Hegelianized
Kantianism as a form of moral theory. The reason
for that is that I’ve been trying to free myself of
theory mongering, and offering Hegelianized
Kantianism as one more solution to the problem
of human life that just happens to be better than
either utilitarianism or existentialism or
Kantianism seems to me not to do much good. I
mean the thought that one should walk around in
the world carrying little signs saying ’I’m a
Hegelianized Kantian’ does not seem to me to be
very helpful. So that’s part of the reason for
drifting away from the idea that Kantianism is a
definite theory of the moral life to be defended.
A second reason for the somewhat diminished
presence of Hegel in my recent work is the fact
that there is a much richer Kant available now as
a result of scholarship. I don’t think it’s quite
right that Kant is concerned only with the voice
of stern duty. In fact in the Religion he explicitly
criticizes the Stoics and defends Epicurus for
cultivating a kind of cheerful enjoyment of life.
Now Kant is certainly not an Epicurean. It’s
rather that for him cheerfulness in the doing of
our duty and the realization of our human capaci-
ties is part of what it is to be open to the force of
reason in one’s life.
D: As you know yourself, he makes the distinc-
tion between what he calls anthropology on the
one hand, and morality in the stricter sense.
E: He does indeed.
D: One of the issues concerning the stability of
the Kantian system is how you get from one to
the other. ‘Anthropology’ brings one down once
again into the equivocal matrix, where cheerful-
ness has its ethical significance also
E: I think Kant is quite aware of all that. It is
true that the moral law has objective and binding
force, independently of any anthropological or
empirical considerations. To that extent, what
Kant calls pure moral philosophy is independent
of anthropology or subjective or impure moral
philosophy, but Kant never wavered in the
thought that an account of the realizability of that
pure moral philosophy in human life was desper-
ately important to give. He lectured on anthropol-
ogy every year for roughly 30 years, and he both
wrote about and contributed to pedagogical de-
bates in his time. Even the preface to the Critique
of Pure Reason talks about the role of philosophy
as critical self-discipline in a coming renovation
of culture. So there’s a very important sense in
which Kant’s own concerns as a philosopher were
centred around the idea that it was his job to
reform the culture from within, not only from
without: that is to speak to the culture as it stands
and to point the way to the proper exercise of
reason within cultural life, not in absolute com-
manding authority over it. So I do think that the
recent Kant scholarship that’s brought out the
essential interconnection between the pure moral
philosophy and the impure moral philosophy has
been very important, focusing as I said on the
historical essays and the Critique of Judgment.
One could note that in the Critique of Teleologi-
cal Judgment there’s actually a brief discussion —
my reference here is Akademie 445 to 446 — of
the naturalness of gratitude as a human feeling.
Kant is even aware of things like that.
D: However, the notion of ‘naturalness’ is very
ambiguous in Kant, because if it is natural, it is
not moral, in the proper Kantian sense. There’s a
natural sympathy for a child crying; I feel sympa-
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thy for their pain but that’s ‘pathological.’ But
there’s also a practical sympathy which has its
definition within the purity of the moral domain.
So there is a natural gratitude, but a moral grati-
tude? Is there a moral gratitude?
E: He says that man needs a moral intelligence, a
God, because man exists for an end, and this end
and its realizability require a being that formed
both him and the world with that end, his end, in
view. It is a waste of labour to go behind these
feelings for motives, for they are immediately
connected with the purest moral sentiment: grati-
tude, obedience, and humility. So in Kant’s un-
derstanding gratitude is a moral sentiment.
D: How would you respond to this line of argu-
mentation that there is a God in Kant, but it’s a
God that comes in to the system at a certain
point, because without this supersensible beyond
the whole moral structure risks collapse. Consider
his doctrine of the summum bonum; there is the
need for a convergence between happiness and
virtue; because the good are often not happy in
this life, but they morally merit happiness, we
have to project an idea of the convergence of
happiness and virtue into the next life, and God
has to be the ground that guarantees this project-
ed unity of happiness and virtue. My point would
not be to deny the rich suggestiveness of thinking
about God via the moral way, but this: I suspect
that the God Kant projects is in the image of the
moral human being as Kant conceives him; hence
we have a certain God of the law who will exact-
ly proportions our merit to happiness, our happi-
ness to merit. Kant is quite plain about this. You
will only get happiness in exact proportion to
your moral merit. I see here a kind of moralistic
univocity in this claim of a one-to-one correspon-
dence between happiness and moral merit, all
administered by a God who does the transcenden-
tally legal bookkeeping in the Beyond. And why
I’m putting this question is: such a God is a
certain moral God but it’s not a God of grace that
is given in unearned fashion. I often think of
Kant and the parable of the vineyard. Everyone
gets what’s their due, but some get more than
their due - and without working for it! When I
read that, I often ask myself : Would Kant not be
horrified at the idea that this Lord gives more
than is due? Where is the one-to-one correspon-
dence between reward and merit? Such a God,
what I would call the agapeic God, evokes grati-
tude but in no merely abject sense. This seems to
me to be very difficult to maintain within the
economy of Kant’s teaching, both his moral doc-
trines per se, but also his moral theology, his
moralized sense of the divine.
E: I think that it is not the case that Kant’s
thoughts about religion are a mere late addition to
his system, concerned to prop it up against cer-
tain objections that insist that human beings natu-
rally and inevitably seek happiness. The sense of
human being as created being, geschöpfes Wesen,
is very strong in Kant from the very beginning
on, I think. That is, we experience our lives as
bearing the burden of the task of the realization
of reason. The idea in the History essay that
nature — and here by nature Kant means not
physical nature but something more like rational
nature in general; in his terminology this comes
very close to being identified with the divine —
has appointed for us a destiny is already an indi-
cation of the depth of his anti-naturalism. So the
sense of human beings as created beings who
bear a task is very strong throughout his work.
Second, it is true that Kant conceives of God as
that being who proportions happiness to merit.
That’s quite right. I think that there is a substan-
tive point to conceiving of God in that way on
Kant’s part, and that is to resist both the ground-
ing of ethics in empirical considerations of happi-
ness and secondly to resist pictures of God as an
inscrutable authority, pictures that risk supporting
a form of fanaticism when we attempt to identify
our purposes with His. So there is a good bit of
this picture of what one might call a rationalized
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God in Kant, but I think it’s worth defending.
D: Would you be uncomfortable with a God that
could not be so rationalized?
E: Yes, I would be uncomfortable with an in-
principle inscrutable God — not that all God’s
ways can be made explicit either, however. The
third point I want to make is that I think that this
picture is compatible with a kind of moral egali-
tarianism. Kant does hold that different human
beings have different talents in different
measures, but possess pure practical reason or
conscience in common. Some people can run
faster than others, other people have a better ear.
Some people can cook better than others, some
people are actually sympathetic and better at
hearing what small children are worried about.
Nowhere does Kant deny that there are those
divergences in talents, and he insists that the
coming to fulfilment of reason’s requirements
will take the form ultimately of a moral commu-
nity, not a single person. It will require each
single person doing her or his work in order to
bring this about. In that interesting sense, for
Kant virtue cannot be taught. Any philosophical
account of virtue must be fundamentally a piece
of elucidatory criticism, must be revelatory, must
open each individual to the exercise of the pow-
ers of conscience that are in us. But then as we
achieve a moral community through conscien-
tiousness we will lead textured different lives in
detail, in which people will care about different
practices and different forms of happiness. In that
sense I think even the old image of Kant as op-
posed to an Aristotelian aristocratism, with its
emphasis on the cultivation of the intellect, was
right. All that emphasis on Kant’s liberalism in a
way was right from the very beginning. Kant sees
human life as ultimately multiform.
Oh, I didn’t say anything about the bit about
grace. I think that having conscientiousness or
having conscience for Kant is a gift of God. It’s a
gift of God that we must do something with, not
simply have. That would be a distinct Kantian
spin on what grace is. It consists in God’s having
given us practical reason.
D: But are we not here talking about gifts of such
a character that, if one follows through on the
meaning of gift, any ethics of autonomy must be
severely relativized, if not even given up entirely?
E: Severely relativized, yes, absolutely. My inter-
est, as I said, is in the dramatistics of the quest to
lead an autonomous life and in the different ways
those dramatistics are played out; yes absolutely
they must be relativized. As Kant says in the
History essay, ‘nature has revealed a little but
only a very little’ of the path towards a kingdom
of ends. What nature has perhaps revealed is that
a republic or a civil society of law is a necessary
precondition for the ultimate cultivation of a
moral culture. But how to go on from that kind
of civil society of law to the substantive moral
culture that is our task is hidden from us.
D: We can perhaps turn to another major aspect
of your work, namely, your concern with litera-
ture and aesthetics. Some of your work is not
dissimilar to the work that Martha Nussbaum has
done, the effort to bring philosophy and literature
into dialogue with each other and particularly in
relation to the question of the ethical or moral
significance of literature. Perhaps you might say
something about your work on that score: the
moral dimension of the aesthetic, or is that too
simplistic a way to put it?
E: I can certainly say something about that. As I
suggested in talking about my own experiences in
growing up earlier on, my interest has always
been more in art and its powers than in aesthet-
ics. There’s a great deal of philosophical aesthet-
ics that’s taken the form of trying to define art
and to distinguish art and artistic practices from
moral, religious, cognitive or other forms of
practice. I have almost no interest in that enter-
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prise whatsoever, so defining art is not something
that’s important to me at all. What is important to
me, is to figure out what the best works of art,
the exemplars, the ones that seem to show what
art’s powers are all about, to figure out what
those works do. I think they provide a certain
kind of expression and orienting guidance to
human moral imagination in culture, not in the
form of rules that we can follow to live well, but
in the form of a sense of enlarged vision of the
human condition and its possibilities. In seeing
works of art as products of human imagination
responding to a moral condition, yes, I think my
work is very much like Martha Nussbaum’s in
this area. The difference is that where she looks
more to Aristotle for the background set of moral
terms that structure exercises of human imagina-
tion I look more to Kant. The difference I think
is that Kant is here a post-Christian thinker and
so some of the fundamental terms for him are
conscientiousness, freedom and the moral equality
of all persons before God. I think of the Aristote-
lian tradition as much less plausible on those
topics, having very little to say about them,
though certainly as I’m sure Martha Nussbaum
would say perhaps a modernized and more con-
temporary Aristotelianism could make some room
for those values. In general, the important point I
think is that my work in the philosophy of art has
not been so much oriented towards definition or
establishing rules of criticism as instead to exam-
ining the cultural work that certain exemplars do,
certain exemplars of the exercise of human imagi-
nation.
D: Do some of the tensions we looked at earlier
reappear here? I mean: one way to look at Kant’s
aesthetics is at someone who perhaps was the
first to treat art as something for itself, and to
give it a domain of its own. And yet one reads
further in the Critique of Judgement, finally the
aesthetic is inseparable from the moral. I’m think-
ing of the notion of beauty as a symbol of the
moral good. And some criticisms of Kantian
aesthetics have been precisely that the very auton-
omy of art, proclaimed in earlier pages, is retract-
ed as the system develops. This seems to me
totally consistent with Kant’s overall project. But
more Romantic autonomists of art (as we might
call them) resent the moralization of art that
seems to creep back in at the end. Where do you
see yourself on that spectrum? If embeddedness is
important, it brings you and art back to the ethos,
to ethics. But if moral autonomy is the god pre-
siding over the entire horizon, aren’t you creating
a situation full of radical tensions from the begin-
ning?
E: Well, it will be no surprise to hear that I want
to have it both ways in a way here. I do think
Kant is quite correct early on in the Critique of
Judgment to distinguish from one another plea-
sure in the good (in the morally good), pleasure
in the agreeable (that which gratifies), and plea-
sure in the beautiful. I do think there is some-
thing different about our response to beauty, and
Kant insofar as he draws those distinctions is a
certain kind of autonomy theorist. As he goes on
later in the Critique of Judgment to develop his
conception of the work of art, it turns out that the
work of art is both a beautiful work, so the kind
of pleasure that we take in it involves in part
pleasure in the beautiful, and it stems from a sub-
lime power’s originality, the power of genius. So
in a sense the work of art, our experience of the
work of art, fuses the experiences of the beautiful
and the sublime. It still is different from the
experience we have of either the morally good or
the agreeable. That there are such experiences
available to us and that there are cultural works
that make available these experiences is itself a
morally important thing, and much of my work
on the philosophy of art has been to say in detail
and with references to particular cases, how and
why it is so important that they afford us a differ-
ent kind of experience involving something like
an enlarged vision or perspective on our condi-
tion that isn’t available to us if we are working
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only within the framework of the questions ‘What
is the morally good thing to do? What is the
prudential thing to do? Or, what can we know in
this particular case?’ Art’s exploration of our
condition is free from control by those kinds of
questions I think. And in its very freedom from
that kind of control, it’s morally significant. It
opens up to us the possibility of angles of vision
on things.
D: Maybe I could come here to the question of
originality. Certainly in your most recent book
the notion of spontaneity is central. You discuss
it, not only in relation to Kant and other figures
in German Romanticism, but also in relation to
contemporary reductionistic theories of a more
naturalistic variety. Spontaneity is connected also
to the notion of genius. I mentioned Nussbaum
and Cavell as figures with some proximity to
you. Cavell is a more wayward voice than Nuss-
baum. I’m not using ‘wayward’ in a pejorative
sense, but it brings to mind your remarks about
the subject of control. I’m wondering about way-
wardness as somehow on the other side of com-
pletely rule-governed activity. I’m wondering if it
is the Romantic in you that is finally more funda-
mental, or that side of Kant that leans more
strongly towards Enlightenment ideals. Or is this
a tension which continues in your work and
which hasn’t been resolved on one side or the
other. I could put it further again: Is it possible
always to have a ‘both/and’ between more mod-
erated rule-bond activity and an appeal to sponta-
neity, originality and the potential lawlessness
that could go with it. You want to have it both
ways: you want to walk on the wild side; and yet
there is a certain conscientiousness in your vision
which balks against wildness.
E: That’s quite correct. For me the question is
less whether it’s possible always to have a
“both/and” sort of attitude towards this, than whe-
ther it’s possible not to. I find the “both/and”’
attitude just unavoidable for me, so yes, I very
deeply endorse the Romantic wish, as it were, to
fall in love with our own lives, I mean not just
the details of my particular life but with human
life as it is realized in me and in others. This will
no doubt require a certain revolutionary transfigu-
ration of human life as it is realized in me and in
others in order that we become capable of falling
in love with it. And yet at the same time, I think
that the wish for that kind of revolutionary trans-
figuration can be dangerous politically. Later
forms of Romanticism were accused of a kind of
subjectivism and even a kind of political fascism.
So respect for the civil society of law, for human
rights, for settled ordered procedures of cognition
in figuring out the surrounding material circum-
stances of our condition, all these are very impor-
tant Enlightenment values to me as well. How is
it that one seeks transfiguration of the human
condition so as to fall in love with our lives and
realize the task of humanity once and for all and
yet does so without being premature and hubristic
and untrustworthy? That seems to me to be a
great deal of the trick, and I wouldn’t want to
give way to sentimentalized, subjectivized, and
individualized Romanticism at all.
D: But could you say: in order to be open to
such a transfiguration, one thing you will have to
give up is an insistence on your own autonomy.
The dangers, of course, are something like hubris,
or a certain fascism taking different forms. Sup-
pose one argued that the ‘giving up,’ the surren-
der of autonomy in the genuine sense is not at all
a hubristic lawlessness? It’s lawless but it’s not
hubristic, because the transfiguration on giving up
your autonomy is not another form of will to
power, which is also another form of hanging on
to your autonomy. Is there a different form of
‘creativity’ and ‘originality’ beyond autonomy?
Could you make a case like that?
E: It depends on what one means by autonomy.
If one has to give up any strong form of moral
individualism, then yes I think that’s correct. If
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one means by autonomy something closer to the
Kantian sense, namely action motivated by
reason’s own commands where reason is imper-
sonal and shared out among us, then I don’t want
to give up autonomy in that sense. I certainly
want to give up any individual’s claim to be the
sole possessor of reason’s law. So yes, moral
individualism in any strong or interesting sense
has to go by the boards, though it is also true that
sometimes there can be conscientious people who
can be as individuals out ahead of their culture.
One wishes not to forget that there are the Fred-
erick Douglasses of the world also.
D: But what if I made the case that, on your
terms, there’s a necessity that you’re going to be
perpetually caught between aspiration and disap-
pointment. Why? Because if you don’t give up
autonomy, you won’t open yourself to a release
beyond autonomy; and the very insistence on
reasons before surrender actually shortcircuits the
possibility of that further release. I’m not arguing
for madness, but one is brought closer to some-
thing like a notion of divine madness. This is in
the same neighbourhood as the idea of the genius.
But if one insists always on having reasons in ad-
vance or even justifying reasons after the fact,
that very release may precisely not happen, be-
cause of that insistence.
E: I think that reason comes with, Kantian reason
comes with, enormous abstractness at the level of
the principle. There is a kind of released power in
specific actions, in such a way that one’s action
comes from a reason that is beyond discursivity.
This is after all Kant’s picture of the genius who
cannot explain why he does what he does. He
does still respond to reason’s commands but it’s
not the kind of calculative or discursive reason
that we’re most accustomed to thinking of as
reason. Is it in Wordsworth that we’re called
upon in one place to reason with a deeper reason
that involves precisely this kind of release, even a
kind of sense of abandonment of oneself as a
particular individual possessed of possibilities of
prudential calculation? That kind of abandonment
or release seems to me to be extraordinarily im-
portant.
D: Again to come back to Kant: Isn’t this Kant’s
piety: any release in its source must be rational,
and also rational in its consequences? I’m think-
ing of someone we haven’t talked about but very
relevant to this issue — the power of art, its
metaphysical power as well as ethical import — I
mean Nietzsche. You could see Nietzsche’s glori-
fication of the artist as radicalizing Kant’s doc-
trine of genius but in a direction that Kant would
not endorse at all. The truly autonomous man, the
higher autonomous man (Nietzsche suggests a
higher autonomy in the Genealogy of Morals) is
the one not defined by the struggle between mas-
ter and slave but is higher again. But he’s higher
because he’s gone deeper into the very source he
calls will to power, Dionysus. In doing that, he
runs the risk of a kind of madness at both ex-
tremes. And yet Nietzsche claims that there is a
transfiguration possible at those extremes. We’re
in the middle of extremes but there are different
ways of living between these extremes. Kant is
extremely cautious about releasing these other
energies. I find that you’re less cautious but you
still have a diffidence. The old Kant keeps you
conscientious. Conscientiousness keeps drawing
you back to the more moderate human middle.
E: I think that Kant underarticulates all that could
be involved in accession to ecstasies, to reason’s
commands, or to release into the realm of human
creativity. And there is an interesting sense in
which Nietzsche does indeed articulate that. But I
am a long way from being convinced by a great
deal of Nietzsche. I do think that he runs the risk
of subjectivizing the response to the Dionysian or
installing a wild Dionysian sensibility as the most
important cultural achievement much too much. I
certainly cannot endorse Nietzsche’s doctrine of
the moral significance of the sovereign individual
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as the late fruit of culture, as opposed to a moral
culture, but my real heart here is probably with
Wordsworth as doing better in articulating what it
means and what it is like to be released into
creativity, while yet still retaining a sense of the
importance of common life and political structure
as we have it as well. I’m thinking of the inter-
esting interplay between Wordsworth’s most
powerful description of that release in book 6 of
The Prelude, where Wordsworth describes how
he saw the sounding cataract and the rugged cliffs
as characters and types of a great apocalypse that
made it clear to him that our home, he says, is
with infinity, with expectation and desire and
something evermore about to be. A sense of
being given over to that is what comes over him.
And yet at the same time he tries to connect that
sense of being given over to that in himself and
in other people to what he calls in another place
the simple produce of the common day. I think of
Nietzsche as lacking in a sense of respect for the
simple produce of the common day.
D: Yes, let us say that when Wordsworth invokes
something infinite, is it not the case that the
moral is being brought to the limits of the moral?
Are we not also bringing the artistic to the limits
of the artistic or the aesthetic? Why? Because
aspirations and longings like that should more
properly be called religious longings. Religion, of
course, is a plurivocal phenomenon and religion
doesn’t necessarily have to be identified with
monotheistic traditions. But I bring that question
up here because of your interest in the German
poetry of Hölderlin, who directly connects us
with Nietzsche in another line of relation. Cer-
tainly here we have a certain pantheistic sense of
nature. Given that sense of nature and the art that
emerges from the longing for oneness, shouldn’t
that art properly be called religious art? ‘Reli-
gious,’ of course, is not here the devotional art of
the Christian tradition. Yet this art is religious
insofar as something beyond the power of the
human being comes to be shown; the poet tries to
say something about that beyond, even though the
beyond is here and now.
E: I entirely agree with that. I can’t add anything
to it. I think there is every reason to think of this
kind of responsiveness as religious, yes.
D: But we come back to the question of the
sublime. I think it’s interesting to think of the
18th century concern with the sublime as having
a religious source, related to dissatisfaction with
the mechanistic nature of the Newtonian world-
picture, and to a feeling for ‘something more
deeply interfused,’ as Wordsworth put it, appear-
ing in and through the very aesthetic happening
of nature itself. Is the post-Kantian concern with
art a kind of equivocal engagement with the
religious that finds it difficult to name itself as
such? Why do I ask that question? Because de-
spite the critique of religion by Enlightenment
reason — religion as priestcraft and superstition
and bad heteronomy and tyrannical transcendence
— the religious longing does not at all disappear,
but it tends to migrate into art from its more
traditional, ecclesiastical home. Is this something
that is relevant to your work or have these ques-
tions occupied you?
E: Yes, I’ve been very influenced for many years
by M. H. Abrams’ wonderful book Natural Su-
pernaturalism and by its picture of modern litera-
ture, exemplified above all by Wordsworth, as a
literature of secularized prophecy as the poet tries
to assume the role of the vates of the culture.
There is certainly a religious impulse at the root
of this; there is certainly a religious impulse that
has trouble recognizing or naming itself as a
religious impulse, because of the association I
think of religion in the minds of these figures
with its institutionalized forms that they cannot
support. Hölderlin, for example, was in seminary
destined for a career as a Lutheran minister. He
gave it up. He could not support this religious
form. Wordsworth had open to him at numbers of
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stages of his early life the possibility of taking
orders and becoming a parish priest in the Angli-
can church and he could not do it. So they do
resist the authority of religion in its institutional-
ized forms very strongly. This resistance to reli-
gious institutionalized authority gives them trou-
ble in naming their own impulses as religious,
yes, but they are deeply religious impulses.
D: Does this bring again to this question of em-
beddedness? First of all, the notion of secular
prophecy seems to be a very double-headed crea-
ture: if you say your prophecy is secular, you are
having your cake and eating it; you have your
prophetic mantle, but at the same time you keep
your politically correct Enlightenment secularism.
I’m not saying this about you. I’m saying this
about this notion of secular prophecy. But is the
religious longing doomed to become just a long-
ing, if it is also not embedded in social practice.
The rejection of tradition and of institutional
forms may well be motivated by perceptions of a
bad heteronomy. But longing as mere longing has
usually the effect of vaporizing in its very expres-
sion. So the issue of social embeddedness must
come back: you may free yourself from one form
of embeddedness, but if one’s aspiration for tran-
scendence is not once more re-engaged in some
form of community which is the social body of
the religious, there follows almost an inevitable
futility or emptiness to the aspiration.
E: Much of the history of both Jewish and Chris-
tian religion is I think intelligible as a kind of
struggle or dialectic between the priests and the
prophets. One of the things that that story in both
the Hebrew Bible and the Christian Bible makes
evident is that in a way both are needed. The
visionaries, the prophets who would remind us of
how we have betrayed the covenant and how we
yet have possibilities of fulfilling it are wild,
crazy, unpredictable, but very important. So is the
effort on the part of the priests to give stable
form to whatever religious understanding might
be, stable social form. In this respect you could
think of the priests as the Ur-figures or predeces-
sors perhaps of Enlightenment and of the proph-
ets as the predecessors of Romanticism. So, just
as I wish to walk a line between my interests in
Enlightenment and in Romanticism, so too with
the priests and prophets. I think for me the way
to do this is not so clearly to return to religious
institutions. In this I share the sense of Words-
worth and Hölderlin that the authority of religious
institutions reposes on social facts and supersti-
tions that may not be supportable, but instead to
try to show as Wordsworth in particular tried to
show, how prophetic authority could be shared
out in all of us, among all of us in the course of
common life. Maybe that pushes me a little bit
toward the Romantic side again. But the idea here
— and it’s certainly now a more explicitly Chris-
tian idea than a Judaic idea — would be that
conscientiousness is the route in each of us to the
conduct of our own ordinary daily lives in pro-
phetic terms. So the prophet is not simply a per-
son apart who requires social situation; the proph-
et is a figure of the voice of conscience in each
of us.
B: In the epistemological discussion we have, on
one side, people who assign primacy to what is
expressed and consider concrete vehicles of ex-
pression as secondary. This idea is found in the
popular understanding that the meaning of what
is said is ideally contained in what is intended. It
is also contained in the belief that the relevance
of a religious ritual should be derived from the
religious truth which that ritual brings to expres-
sion or in the belief that the experience of beauty
one finds in observing a natural landscape, for
instance, refers back to some unmediated experi-
ence. In all these cases it seems to be taken for
granted that the meaning of signs, institutions,
norms, narratives and rituals refers back to some-
thing more original and more essential which in
one or another non-articulated way exists in itself,
independent of the way in which it is given con-
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crete expression. On the other hand, there are
many psychologists, linguists and philosophers
who point to the inseparability of concrete lan-
guage and the mental activity of grasping a mean-
ing, or to the unbreakable bond between signifier
and signified, or to the meaning-giving character
of the place occupied within a structure by meta-
phorical and metonymical signs. This second
approach makes it self-evident that religion can-
not exist without traditional forms, without lan-
guage, without being part of a community. I
suspect that you are more inclined toward the
first tendency?
E: I am much closer to the first, but I find little
use for the term intuition. I think we are open to
experiences of meaningfulness that are not, in any
sense, entirely informed by already existent con-
ventions or ways of thinking of things. There are
certainly dramatically creative uses of language.
Metaphors are minor miracles of this that express
a responsiveness to things that is not built into
linguistic convention already. At the same time
the capability of this kind of responsiveness is
part of the capability of language in general. I
think we only have metaphors in part because we
have an ordinary life with language. So there is a
kind of ongoing dialectic or conversation between
the conventional, social side of our existence and
the improvisatory, visionary side of our existence.
I don’t think you can divide it neatly up into
opposed sides and say that religious experiences
and possibilities are to be identified only with
one side of this rather than another. One of the
major ideas of my Wittgenstein book is to talk
about the roots of human mindedness as lying
both in something mysteriously just given, some-
thing I identify with Kantian spontaneity there,
which is in some sense prior to the linguistic, and
yet mindedness comes really into actual existence
only insofar as that spontaneity engages with a
given linguistic order. There is no definite begin-
ning. As Wordsworth once wrote, ‘Hard task,
vain hope to analyze the mind, /When each most
obvious and particular thought, /Not in a mystical
or idle sense, /But in words of reason deeply
weighed, /Hath no beginning.’ We can’t find the
original wellsprings of our responsiveness to the
divine or of our talk with one another. Respon-
siveness to the divine and our talk in life with
one another are internally related to each other,
always.
B: Truly, can there be, in terms of your position,
something such as a non-mediated experience?
E: Well, I’m not sure about the word ‘immediate’
there. Openness to religious experience often
comes I think, perhaps even typically comes,
from having deeply internalized what people are
already doing and thinking about themselves and
human life, and then doing something different
with it. It is for me an ongoing dialectic or con-
versation, and so not immediate but enabled. One
of the most striking things about Jesus to me and
about the Gospels generally is that virtually every
remark of Jesus is an allusion to or transcription
of some remark in the Hebrew Bible. What
makes Him what He is in part is his having so
deeply internalized Hebrew scriptures, and the
Gospel writers in general showed Jesus not as
just an historical person who happens to be spe-
cial in some sense, but as someone in recounting
whose life we always find ourselves using the
terms of the Hebrew Bible. His responsiveness to
the Hebrew Bible is what makes Him in some
sense what He is, His original responsiveness to
it.
D: Perhaps we might finish with one or two more
questions. When you were talking earlier about
Hölderlin in relation to tradition and institutional
forms, I couldn’t help but think that what you
were suggesting was something like an incognito
religious community that could not be identified
with traditional Christian forms but nevertheless
had a certain religiosity too. And then I thought
of the notion of Hen kai pan - which you actually
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cite in one of the epigrams to your new book. Of
course, Hölderlin, Schelling and Hegel talked
about Hen kai pan as the cry of what they named
their ‘new church invisible.’ In your exchange
with Bart, I was thinking of the invisibility of the
church and its social manifestation. What of the
issue of Kant and pantheism: in the latter the
divine is imaged in terms of absolute wholeness;
whereas earlier you were praising Kant for having
a sense of the creature. As I understand the doc-
trine of creation, the difference between God and
the world is not negotiable. So you cannot have
simply one whole out of which human beings
emerge as distinct. As I understand Kant, he was
very much intent upon dissociating his own phi-
losophy from any imputation of Spinozism and
pantheism. Is there not some tension here, a
tension that perhaps Hölderlin himself experi-
enced. When he talked about Jesus as being one
of the last brothers of Dionysus, the tension be-
tween Athens and Jerusalem, Greek philosophy
and monotheistic revelation seems to reappear.
My question: does not pursuing one direction
lead you in the end to a different sense of home
than the other? The sense of being at home in the
world as creation is not actually the same as
being at home in the original unity that divides
itself into subject and object. Your current re-
searches on Hölderlin seem to point in the second
direction. But so much of your own moral com-
mitments and your remarks here on the religious
seem to point in the other direction. So I wonder
if there’s a deep tension here. Can you actually
have both of those? Or must the meaning of
creation be rethought (as I think it must), certain-
ly not creation as the machine world of New-
tonianism, but in a manner not void of some of
the aesthetic resonances of pantheism. The glory
of creation has been imaged in a long religious
tradition, creation as ambiguously communicating
signs of the divine to us; but there is not just
simply one whole within which we are, but rather
a plurality of wholes, including the divine whole
which is not reducible to finite creation.
E: Yes, certainly the idea of a kind of church
invisible or counter-institution is very important
for me. In sheerly autobiographical terms it’s
worth noting that I am a child of the sixties in
that respect, so the idea of a counterculture, in
which there was an image purveyed of fully
human relations rather than instrumental relations
between people, was very important in my com-
ing to consciousness. ‘Bliss it was in that dawn to
be alive, /And to be young was very heaven.’ I
do think of much of my work as a philosopher as
contributing to the articulation of the idea of a
counterculture or a church invisible of human
responsiveness and non-instrumental relations,
both articulating the general idea of such a thing
and contributing through the teaching of and the
writing about philosophy and literature to its
realization in conversation. That is very, very
important to me. About creation, I understand the
relation ‘x creates y’ to be much more a logical
relation than a temporal relation. It is to say that
x is the ground of the being of y, part of the
logos of y, that sustains y in its finite being. So it
is possible I think to bring these two thoughts
together by thinking of an artistic church invisible
or counterculture as one of the ways of realizing
the logos of our being that is involved in our
created nature. That’s the way I think of this, that
the church invisible is an anticipation of fuller
humanity as it were, of a fuller realization of our
created nature.
D: One last question: Earlier you talked about
Jesus internalizing the scriptures. As you spoke I
was thinking: When Jesus prayed, he did not say
something like ‘Our scriptures that go back to
father Abraham, etc., etc. He says ‘Our Father,
who art in heaven’. I am motivated to ask about
that, given that you indicated a certain sympathy
for the counterculture. One way to read the coun-
terculture is precisely as having great difficulty in
saying ‘Our Father.’ Fathers somehow have in-
herited the image of that tyrannous heteronomy
that seems to me so widespread in modernity. I
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was reading Kant’s Religion within the Limits of
Reason and there is a revealing footnote where he
refers to ‘Pfaffentum.’ The English translation
given is ‘Clericalism.’ Kant refers to the authority
of a spiritual father pappa (given by Kant in the
Greek). Kant is here also speaking of the invisi-
ble church, but he is very hostile to what he sees
as the spiritual despotism of the pappas. He does
not want any ‘Papa’ telling him what to do.
E: That was certainly a dominant impulse and a
main problem with the counterculture of the
Sixties, speaking in purely historical terms. I
think the thought that the counterculture would
achieve non-instrumental human relations simply
by casting off the shackles associated with fathers
was much of what it was about, and so it turned
out to be a not very long lasting or deep form of
church invisible. I think an artistic counterculture
where art involves discipline and precursors and
attention to diverse forms of human life perhaps
doesn’t involve that sense of throwing off the
shackles of the fathers quite so strongly. I have
myself relatively little difficulty with saying ‘my
father’ in various contexts, but I would trace this
back not to Jesus’s unique calling on Our Father
or His Father but back also to the language of the
Lord, of Yahweh in the Hebrew Bible, so there is
an attitude of submissiveness to the logos that
grounds our being. That is very important and
that will play a role in any form of cultural life in
which we seek non-instrumental human relations
that will turn out to be lasting, will turn out not
to suffer from the tendency just to collapse into
selfishness that the Sixties counterculture did
collapse in.
D: Good, thank you very much.
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